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Abstract 
 
We develop a tractable  general theory for the study of the economic and demographic impact of epidemics. In particular, we  analytically 
characterise the short and medium term consequences of epidemics for population size, age pyramid, economic performance and income 
distribution. To this end, we develop a three-period overlapping generations where altruistic parents choose optimal health expenditures for 
their children and themselves. The survival probability of (junior) adults and children depend on such investments. Agents can be skilled or 
unskilled. The model  emphasizes the role of orphans. Ophans are not only penalized in front of death , they  are also penalized in the access 
to education. Epidemics are modeled as one period exogenous shocks to the survival rates.  We identify three kinds of epidemics depending 
on how the epidemic shock alters the marginal efficiency of health expenditures. We first study the demographic dynamics, and prove that 
while a one-period epidemic shock has no permanent effect on income distribution, it can perfectly alter it in the short and medium run. We 
then study the impact of the three kinds of epidemics when they hit children and/or junior adults. We prove that while the three epidemics 
have significantly different demographic implications in the medium run, they all imply a worsening in the short and medium run of 
economic performance and income distribution. In particular, the distributional implications of the model mainly rely on orphans: if orphans 
are more penalized in the access to a high llevel of education than in front of death, they will necessarily lead to the medium-term increase in 
the proportion of the unskilled, triggering the impoverishment of the economy at that time horizon. 
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1. Introduction 
Though the study of the economic effects of epidemics has always been of interest to many 
economists (see for example Hirshleifer, 1987), the more recent HIV/AIDS pandemic and its 
apparent massive demographic effects, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has suggested an 
exceptionally abundant literature. Yet, there is no common view of the medium and long run 
consequences of such an epidemic on economic growth so far.  
In particular, the impact of AIDS on economic growth has been investigated in many 
empirical studies4. While Bloom and Mahal (1997) found a statistically insignificant 
coefficient on the AIDS variable and conclude that AIDS has had little impact on growth, 
McDonald and Roberts (2006) identified a strong effect of the stock of general health on 
average income in developing countries, and concluded that the marginal impact on income 
per capita of a 1% increase in HIV prevalence rate is minus 0.59% in Africa. Of course, the 
discrepancy can be partially attributed to differences in the experimental framework. It can be 
also attributed to the period of analysis, 1980-1992 in the case of Bloom and Mahal, and 
1984-1999 in MacDonald and Roberts. Unfortunately, the discrepancy is still noticeable in the 
most recent wave of contributions to this field (see Young, 2005, Vs Kalemli-Ozcan, 2006).  
 
Such a disagreement on the growth effects of AIDS is also apparent in the empirical literature 
which studies the impact of the Spanish flu (see the excellent work of Brainerd and Siegler, 
2003). At the theoretical level, the discrepancy in the evaluation of the effects of an epidemic 
on economic growth is especially neat in the benchmark growth models, as clearly reflected in 
the analysis of Boucekkine, Diene and Azomahou (2007). Consider for example the 
celebrated textbook by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), chapter 5. Two models are considered 
in this chapter. Both use two production factors:  physical capital and human capital. The 
economy is on a reference balanced growth path when an epidemic, which takes place at date 
0, destroys a part of the human capital, but leaves physical capital intact. In the first model, the 
sector producing the human capital uses the same technology as the sector producing 
consumption goods and physical capital; it is therefore a one-sector model. However, 
investments in both factors must be non-negative (irreversibility). Then the epidemic creates 
an imbalance between the two factors. The economy reacts by setting the investment in 
physical capital to zero, but also by reducing households’ consumption. The correction of the 
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imbalance and the reduction in consumption increase the growth rate of the production of the 
physical good above its reference value. Of course, this growth rate will decline 
monotonically over time until it reaches its initial value.  
The second case considered by Barro and Sala-i-Martin is the celebrated Lucas-Uzawa model 
(see for example Lucas, 1988).  Education, the sector producing human capital, only uses this 
factor as input. The production of consumption good and physical capital uses both factors.  
Then, an epidemic increases the scarcity of human capital, and the wage rate. The high cost of 
operation for the education sector will motivate people to allocate human capital to production 
of goods, rather than to education, the sector that produces the relatively scarce factor. This 
effect tends to retard the economy’s growth rate. The growth rate of gross output (including 
the production of new human capital) will decrease at the time of the epidemic, then it will 
increase monotonically over time until it reaches its reference value. 
 
Hence, the predictions of the two-sector model for economic growth are exactly the opposite 
of those of the one-sector prototype5. There are obvious limitations in the analysis of the 
macroeconomic impact of epidemics as performed in textbook theory. In particular, all the 
models listed above consider that human capital, which aggregates the education level of the 
population and sometimes its health status, is similar to physical capital. However, human 
capital (education and health) is embodied in individuals, inducing possible big differences 
concerning the mechanisms of investment in physical capital. For instance, the death of a 
child or an elderly has no effect on the level of the human capital used in production. Its 
economic effects will be very different from the death of workers in their twenties or thirties, 
which brings the destruction of human capital progressively brought up in them through child 
rearing, formal education and learning on the job.   
Another specificity of the human capital (education and health) is that the amount of it 
embodied in a person strongly results from decisions taken by his parents. Bowles and Gentis 
(2002) quote a series of empirical results for the United States. A son born in the highest 
income decile has a probability of 22.9% to reach the same decile and a probability of 2.4% to 
reach the lowest income decile. A son born in the lowest income decile has a probability of 
1.3% to reach the highest decile and a probability of 31.2% to reach the lowest decile. Grawe 
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and Mulligan (2002) review cross-country evidence showing that countries with lower public 
provision of human capital experience smaller intergenerational mobility. For instance, less 
developed countries exhibit strong intergenerational transmission. The connection between 
the absence of intergenerational mobility and education is well documented. Bowles and 
Gentis show that this situation can also be linked to the health of children, which is itself a 
function of their parents’ income (see also Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2001).  
 
In this paper, we develop a theory of epidemics taking into account the embodied nature of 
human capital, and enhancing the role of parental decisions. For the generality of the theory, we 
consider both child and adult mortality: since human capital is embodied in individuals and 
since parents decide about the education and health expenditures of their children, the 
economic and demographic impacts of epidemics is likely to tightly depend on the age-profile 
of the induced mortality. To increase the scope of our theory, we shall also allow for any 
profile of the marginal efficiency of health expenditures under epidemics. Define at the minute 
the marginal efficiency of health expenditures is the impact on the survival probability of an 
individual of a marginal increase in the latter expenditures. We will allow for different 
epidemiological situations in which this marginal efficiency is either increased, decreased or 
unchanged.   
A last characteristic of our general framework is to explicitly account for the role of orphans. 
When young adults die, not only do they reduce the amount of labour and human capital used 
in production, but they also leave orphans behind them. To show how this effect can be 
disastrous, we can quote the following extract of an article published by The Economist 
(2003) ``… one-in-ten sub-Saharan children is now an orphan. A third of these are the result 
of AIDS. Orphaning rates above 5% worry UNICEF because they exceed the capacity of local 
communities to care for parentless children. So do places such as Zambia, where almost 12% 
of children are AIDS orphans…. Orphans tend to be poorer than non orphans, and to face a 
higher risk of malnutrition, stunting and death — even if they are free of HIV themselves. 
Orphans are less likely to attend school because they cannot afford the fees but also because 
step-parents tend to educate their own children first”. Case, Pakson and Ableidinger (2004) 
give interesting complements to this view. Orphans live in foster families who discriminate 
against them and in favour of the children of the family head. The probability of the school 
enrolment of an orphan is inversely proportional to the degree of relatedness of the child to the 
household head. Gertler, Levine and Martinez (2003) show that parental loss does not operate 
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only through a reduction in household resources. Parental presence, including the loss of 
mentoring, the transmission of values and emotional and psychological support, plays an 
important role in investment in child human capital.  
There are several papers developing computable general equilibrium models to investigate the 
effects of AIDS, and giving an important role to the increase in the number of orphans. For 
example, Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003) develop such a model applied to the South 
African case. The authors emphasise the formation of human capital and transmission 
mechanism across generations and conclude to a very negative effect of the epidemic on long-
run growth, with a large proportion of families and their offspring falling in a poverty trap. So, 
a transitory shock can have permanent effects. A similar model was developed by Corrigan, 
Glomm and Mendez (2004), who also conclude that the growth effects of AIDS are large. In 
their paper, children receive a different level of education if their parents are healthy or ill. 
However, when they grow up and become adult, the available human capital of their cohort is 
reallocated in an egalitarian way between all its members. This redistribution, which forsakes 
the assumption of embodiment of the investment in education, simplifies the simulation of the 
model, but contradicts the optimisation program of the parents that does not anticipate it. In 
the paper by Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach children are ranked by increasing human capital 
then divided into a finite number of classes. The reallocation of the human capital occurs 
inside each of these classes. Thus, these authors approximate a continuous distribution by a 
discrete distribution. As this approximation can be as precise as desired, this solution is more 
acceptable than the previous one. Finally, none of these papers discusses the effect of an 
epidemic on the marginal efficiency of health expenditures. 
Our paper takes a broader perspective by considering any age-profile of mortality and any 
marginal efficiency of medication under epidemics. The demographic and economic properties 
of the model are fully analytically investigated in the short, medium and long-run, which is 
already a contribution to the literature. In our model, people live for three periods, successively 
as children, junior adults and senior adults. A junior adult has an exogenous number of children 
and is perfectly altruistic that is he only cares for the survival of his children and the social 
position they will get. He invests in his own health and education, and in the health and 
education of his children6. The probability for a child to reach a high level of human capital is 
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independent of the levels of the human capital of his parent, under the conditions that he 
survives and that his parent survives and is able to bring him up. Thus, we have eliminated the 
traditional channel of the cultural heritage to focus on alternative channels which work through 
education and health and investments in both. The probabilities of survival of a child and of a 
junior adult depend on the amounts of money spent by the junior adult for his own human 
capital and for the one of his children.  
The credit market is incomplete: parents cannot finance spending on their children by 
borrowing against their higher expected income, which will result from this spending. So, 
health and education spending and the probabilities of survival will be low if parents are poor.  
Moreover, if a parent dies and if his children become orphans, their probabilities of survival 
will be lowered. Finally, we will assume that an orphan has a lower probability to reach a high 
level of human capital than a child brought up by living parents. Accordingly, a key feature of 
the paper is to consider a crucial dimension of inequality, namely inequality in front of death. 
Inequality between children has several causes. First, the children of less educated parents 
who have survived and who bring them up have a higher probability of dying before growing 
adults because their parents spend less on their health and education. Secondly, less educated 
parents spend less on their own education and health and have a higher probability to die and 
to be unable to bring their children up.  
A key contribution of our paper is the analytical study of the impact of epidemics on the 
income distribution in the short, medium and long-run. It should be noted that the papers 
focusing on AIDS usually comment on the changes in the distributions of human capital and 
income possibly following the epidemic although they do not fully investigate them. The only 
theoretical paper we know, which investigates the links between health spending, mortality 
and the persistence of inequality across generations, is by Chakraborty and Das (2005). These 
authors base their analysis of the persistence of poverty on the fact that poor parents invest 
less in their own health and so have a high probability of dying. Thus, they save little and 
leave to their children a small bequest if they survive and a still smaller bequest if they die. 
The paper assumes that parents only care for the health of their children if they are themselves 
alive when their children grow. However, parents cannot buy annuities against the saving they 
will leave in the case of their premature death (so, in this situation, children get an unplanned 
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bequest). An extension of the paper introduces the possibility of investing, not only in the 
health of parents, but in the education of children too. The productivity of labour depends on 
both these investments. Nonetheless, these authors do not consider investments in the health 
of children nor their survival probability. 
The paper is organised as follows. The second section presents the model and its short run 
equilibrium. The third section is devoted to the transitory dynamics and the long run 
equilibrium of demographic variables. The fourth section investigates the economic and 
demographic effects of epidemics. The fifth section concludes on the possible role of fertility 
behaviour response to epidemics. 
2. The model: behaviour of the agents and temporary equilibrium 
We consider a discrete time, perfect foresight dynamic model of a small open economy. 
People live for three periods, successively as children, junior adults and senior adults. We will 
start by examining the choices of a junior adult in an given period denoted t . In a second 
paragraph we will describe the temporary equilibrium of the model in this period. To ease the 
exposition and to be able to bring out a fully analytical characterization,  we shall refer to a 
single good, health care. The latter should be taken in the much broader sense of any 
investment raising human capital (including education).  
 
2.1. The choices of a junior adult 
A junior adult enters period t  with an endowment in human capital h . Healthcare is the only 
good existing in the economy. It is produced by firms, which use human capital as their 
unique input and which operate under constant returns. We will assume that the productivity 
of human capital is equal to 1 and that firms make no profit. Thus, h  can also be interpreted 
as the earnings of the agent. The agent sets his saving s  and his investment in health l  for the 
period, under the budget constraint  
 
(1) lsh +=  
 
Spending on health has an effect on the lifetime of the agent. His probability of being alive in 
period 1+t  (as a senior adult) is )(lpi . At the end of period t  the agent will have an 
exogenous number n  of children. Senior adults receive no wages. This assumption will 
simplify the model in directions that we are not very interested to investigate. The agent will 
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invest 1+e  in the health of each of his children. The probability for each of them to be alive at 
the beginning of period 2+t  will depend on this investment. If the agent is alive in period 
1+t  and can take care of his children, this probability will be )( 1+eλ . If he is dead and if his 
children are orphans, this probability will be )( 1+ecλ , with 10 <≤< cc .  The saving of the 
agent in period t , s , is lent on the international capital market at the exogenous and constant 
capitalisation rate 1>R . The budget constraint of the agent in period 1+t  is: 
(2) 1+= neRs  
We notice that the amount invested by the agent in the health of his children will be the same 
if the agent dies or stays alive at the end of period t . This investment is equal to the 
capitalisation of the saving made in period t . The intertemporal budget constraint of the agent 
is 
(3) 1++= nelRRh  
To simplify the model we will assume that human capital can take only two values: −h  and 
+h , with: +− << hh0 . We will assume that a child who has living parents and who stays alive 
has a probability p  of obtaining a human capital of +h  and a probability p−1  of obtaining a 
human capital of −h . An orphan who stays alive has the probability q  of obtaining the high 
level of human capital and q−1  of obtaining the low level of human capital. We assume that 
10 ≤<≤ pq . 
Our junior adult has the following utility function in period t  
(4) [ ] [ ] [ ]{ }−−+−−++ +−−++−≡ hhhqclhhhplenU )()(1)()()( 1 νpiνpiλ  
The junior adult is wholly altruistic. His utility only depends on the expected human capital 
accumulated by his children who will reach the adult age. Our specification is in the spirit of 
evolutionary biology (see Galor and Moav, 2002 and 2005, for an earlier attempt to account 
for evolutionary biology ingredients in the theory of economic growth). Consistently with the 
traditional Darwinian theory, the parent should maximize the probability of survival and 
quality of her children. Nonetheless, in contrast to Galor and Moav (2005), we keep the 
number of offspring exogenously fixed. Since we are primarily interested in the impact of 
epidemics and since it is not clear so far whether the latter has lead and/or will lead to a 
substantial change in optimal fertility behaviour, we have preferred to develop our benchmark 
theory with fertility fixed. On the other hand, adding endogenous fertility to the model would 
require additional adjustments which will reduce sharply its tractability. As it will be clear 
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along the way, the model is already heavy to handle algebraically. In the concluding section of 
the paper, we come back to the current AIDS related literature on fertility and examine the 
consequences of an exogenous fertility shock. 
If the junior adult reaches the age of senior adult, he will bring his children up, which will 
increase their probability of survival and their expected levels of human capital. +hν  ( −hν ) 
represents the satisfaction a child brings to his parent when he reaches the adult age with the 
level of human capital +h  ( −h ). We assume that 0>ν . When the child dies this satisfaction 
is 0. We will introduce the following notations 
(5) [ ]−−+ +−= hhhpr )(1 ν , [ ]−−+ +−= hhhqcr )(2 ν  and 1/ 21 −= rrr . 
The utility function of our junior adult in period t  becomes, after having removed a constant 
multiplicative term, [ ]1)()( 1 +≡ + rleU piλ . r  represents the premium in satisfaction brought by 
children, when their parent stays alive, or if one prefers, the utility for parents of staying alive. 
In this case, the probability of survival of each child is higher (by a factor c/1 ) and his 
expected level of human capital is higher too. r , is an increasing function of the inequality in 
earnings, −−+ − hhh /)( , which is expected for the next period. In the following exercises of 
comparative static, we will assume that h  and r  can change independently. Finally, our 
junior adult must solve in period t  the program 
(6) [ ]1)()( 1
, 1
++
+
rleMax
el
piλ  
1++= nelRRh  
0, 1 ≥+el
 
Before solving this program we must give precise specifications of the survival functions:  
(7)  )1/()'()( 111 αλ α −+= −++ AAee , if ( ) )1/(11 1'0 αα −+ −≤+≤ AAe  
1)( 1 =+eλ , if ( ) )1/(11 1' αα −+ −≥+ AAe  
 (8) )1/()'()( 1 βpi β −+= −BBll , if ( ) )1/(11'0 ββ −−≤+≤ BBl  
1)( =lpi , if ( ) )1/(11' ββ −−≥+ BBl  
with: 1,0 << αβ , 0',, >BBA , ( ) )1/(11'0 αα −−<≤ A ,  ( ) )1/(11' ββ −−<B .  
In the rest of the paper we will assume that we are always inside the intervals where both 
functions are strictly increasing. Deaton (2003) notices that health spending, the health state 
and the longevity of an individual are increasing and concave functions of his income: for 
instance the probability for somebody of dying between the ages of 50 and 60 is a decreasing 
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convex function of his income. This concavity is a possible explanation of the impact of 
inequality on the average health state in a country, and it implies that some redistribution of 
income can increase average health.  
Later on, we will define an epidemic as an (anticipated or unanticipated) decrease in one of 
the parameters of the survival function, lasting for one period. There are different kinds of 
epidemics hitting the generation of the junior adults. Indeed, an epidemic can result in the 
decrease of parameter B  or 'B or both. We define the efficiency of adults’ health spending as 
the derivative of their probability of survival with respect to health spending 
( ) ( ) βpi −+=∂∂ '/ BBlBll .  
 
We have:  
( ) ( )[ ]( ) 0''1)/( 12 >++−=∂∂∂ −− ββpi BBlBBlBll , ( ) ( ) 0')'/( 12 <+−=∂∂∂ −− ββpi BBlBBll , 
and ( ) ( ) 0'/ 1222 <+−=∂∂ −− ββpi BBlBll . 
The efficiency of health spending decreases with an epidemic lowering B  and increases with 
an epidemic decreasing 'B . This efficiency decreases for a composite epidemic, which 
decreases the values of parameters B  and 'B  by the same proportion. Finally, the efficiency 
of health spending decreases with the amount of money spent on health, which is a reasonable 
result. Hereafter, we shall call an epidemic of a first kind a shock lowering B  and 'B  by the 
same magnitude. A shock decreasing 'B  (Resp. B ) will be called an epidemic of the second 
(Resp. third) kind. The same considerations could be made on shocks affecting infant 
mortality, we shall therefore adopt the same terminology for epidemics lowering parameters A 
and A’. 
With the survival functions given above, program (6) becomes 
(9) [ ] )1/(1)1/()'()'( 111
, 1
αββα −+−++ −−+
+
BBlrAAeMax
el
 
1++= nelRRh  
0, 1 ≥+el ,  ( ) )1/(11 1' αα −+ −≤+ AAe , ( ) )1/(11' ββ −−≤+ BBl  
 
We make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. The parameters of the model must satisfy the constraints 
(10) ( ) ( )





+
−
−
+−≤++ −+ rB
A
A
R
nBBh /11
1
111'' )1/(1 β
αβ β  
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(11) ( )
AR
nB
A
A
R
nBBh
)1/(11' αα −+ −≤+  
(12) −+<−+
−
− Bh
A
A
R
nBB
r
B ''1'
1
1 βα
β
α
 
(13) ( )βα '1' BBh
rA
A
R
nB
+
−
< −   
 
Now, we can establish the following lemmas.  
Lemma 1. Program (9) has a unique solution defined by the two equations 
(14) β
αα
β
−
−
+=
+
−
−
+
++
− 1
11)'(
1
'
')/('
1BBlrBBl
BhBARnBA
 
(15) )(1 lh
n
R
e −=+   
Proof. Equation (15) is the constraint in program (9). We use this constraint to eliminate 1+e  
from the objective function.  This function is concave in l . Equation (14) is the first order 
conditions of the so-transformed objective function. Let us define the function 
β
α
−+
−
−
+
++
≡ 1)'(
1
'
')/(')(
BBlrBBl
BhBARnBAly . We have 
β
αα
β
−
−
+>
−
−
+
+=
− 1
11
'
1
'
)/('1)0( 1
rBB
BhARnBAy , because of  inequality (12)  
β
αα
β
−
−
+<<
+
−
−
+
+=
− 1
111)'(
1
'
)/('1)( 1BBhrBBh
ARnBAhy , because of  inequality (13)  
0)( −=+∞y . )(ly has a unique minimum, which is negative, for 
( ) [ ])1)(1(
')/('
' βα
β
−−
++
=+
BhBARnBArBBl . 0)( =ly  for ( ) [ ])1(
')/('
'
α
β
−
++
=+
BhBARnBArBBl . Thus, 
equation (12) defines a unique value for l , which is positive and smaller than h .  
We have to check that this solution satisfies ( ) )1/(11' ββ −−≤+ BBl . This is equivalent to 
( )[ ] )1/()1(1'/1 )1/(1 βαβ β −−+≤−− − BBy  , which results from inequality (10).  
We also have to check that ( ) )1/(11 1')(' αα −+ −≤+−=+ Alh
n
RAAAe  or 
( )[ ])1/(11' αα −−−+≥ A
AR
nhl . This condition is satisfied because of inequality (11). □ 
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The two following lemmas describe in detail the characteristics of the optimal decisions taken 
by a junior adult, first concerning investment in his own health, then concerning investment in 
the health of his offspring.  
Lemma 2. a) A well-endowed junior adult invests more in his health than a poorly endowed 
junior adult. b) The investment of a junior adult in his own health increases with his earnings 
and when there is an increase in the utility for parents of being alive. c) The investment of a 
junior adult in his own health decreases when the scale parameter B decreases (epidemic of 
the third kind) and increases when parameter 'B  decreases (epidemic of the second kind). 
This investment decreases if B and 'B decrease by the same percentage (epidemic of the first 
kind). d) The investment of a junior adult in his own health increases when the scale 
parameter of the survival function of his children A  decreases (epidemic of the third kind), 
and decreases when parameter 'A  decreases (epidemic of the second kind). This investment 
does not change when parameters A  and 'A  decrease by the same percentage (epidemic of 
the first kind). f) Unless A’=0, the investment of a junior adult in his own health depends on 
the number of his children: It increases when the later number goes up. 
 
Lemma 3. a) A well-endowed junior adult invests more in the health of his children than a 
poorly endowed junior adult. b) The investment of a junior adult in the health of his children 
increases with his earnings and decreases when there is an increase in the utility for parents 
of being alive. c) The investment of a junior adult in the health of his children increases when 
the scale parameter B decreases and decreases when parameter 'B  decreases. This 
investment increases if parameters B and 'B decrease by the same percentage . d) The 
investment of a junior adult in  the health of his children decreases when the scale parameter 
of the survival function of his children A  decreases, and increases when parameter 'A  
decreases. This investment stays unchanged if parameters A  and 'A  decrease by the same 
percentage. f) Unless A’=0, the total investment of a junior adult in the health of his children 
decreases with the number of children.  
 
The model has several worth-mentioning properties. First, and as announced in the 
introduction section, our model entails inequality in front of death. Children of parents with a 
low human capital have a higher probability of dying before growing. Moreover, such parents 
tend to spend less in their own health care (and education), and hence face a lower survival 
probability with the subsequent negative effect on the human capital of the resulting orphans.  
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Second, the investment decisions taken by the junior adults are sensitive to exogenous 
changes in their survival function (Property c of Lemma 2 and 3) and to shifts in the survival 
function of their children (Property d of Lemma 2 and 3). Put in other words, an epidemic 
hitting young adults as an epidemic hitting their own children will have an impact on the 
investment decisions of these individuals.  
 
The consequences of varying the life expectancy are extensively studied in the literature. Our 
model has some interesting predictions regarding this issue. In the standard theory relying on 
Blanchard-Yaari structures, life expectancy (or the mortality rate) is exogenous. A downward 
shift in the life expectancy generally decreases the marginal return to investment in this 
framework, implying less investment either in physical capital (as in the standard Blanchard 
model, 1985) and/or human capital (as in Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro, 2002). In our 
model, different kinds of epidemics can hit a generation of junior adults. The first and third 
kinds decrease the efficiency of adults’ health investment and the second kind increases the 
efficiency of this investment. Moreover, life expectancy is no longer exogenous. When an 
epidemic of the first or third kind shortens the life expectancy of junior adults, the adults’ 
health expenditure decreases for reasons similar to the ones we just gave and life expectancy 
decreases by more than what results from the direct effect of the epidemic. However, with an 
epidemic of the second kind, adults’ health expenditure increases, which reduces the direct 
effects of the epidemic. The effects of these epidemics on children’s heath investment are 
exactly opposite to those on their parents’ health spending: it increases with the first kind of 
epidemic and decreases with the second kind. 
Actually, our set-up has more subtle predictions concerning children’s health care: the 
investment decisions of the parents are also sensitive to an anticipated drop in the life 
expectancy of their children.  If this drop decreases the efficiency of children’s health 
investment, then, their parents will spend more on their own health and less on their children’s 
health. If this drop increases the efficiency of children’s health investment, then their parents 
will invest less in their own health and more on the health of their children. The second result 
is easy to accept. Parents increase their health expenditures in the benefit of their children 
when they are subject to an exogenous deterioration of their health precisely because their 
utility is entirely determined by the expected human capital accumulated by children who will 
reach the adult age. To understand the first result we must remember that children benefit 
from growing under living parents: orphans will have a higher probability of dying and of 
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reaching a high level of human capital. Thus, parents who decrease the investment in the 
health of their children when their probability of survival has been decreased, continue of 
being perfectly altruistic. They only know that investing in their own health instead of the 
health of their children is the most efficient way of improving the welfare of their children. 
 
We showed that ( ) 0)/(2 >∂∂∂ Bllpi  and ( ) 0)'/(2 <∂∂∂ Bllpi . As health spending is higher for a 
well-endowed than for a poorly endowed junior adult we get the following result. An 
epidemic of the third kind will reduce the probability of survival of junior adults by more for 
the well endowed than for the poorly endowed ones.  An epidemic of the second kind has the 
opposite effect.  
The elasticities of the probability of survival of the junior adults with respect to the parameters 
of this function, are ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )'//// BBlBlBlBl +=∂∂ pipi , and 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )'/''//'/ BBlBBlBl +=∂∂ pipi . We deduce from these expressions and Lemma 2 that an 
epidemic of the third kind will reduce the probability of survival of junior adults by a higher 
proportion for the well endowed than for the poorly endowed ones. An epidemic of the second 
kind has the opposite effect. Of course, a first kind epidemic as a composite epidemic, will 
reduce the probability of survivals of well endowed and poorly endowed junior adults by the 
same proportion. We have a similar result for the effects of an epidemic hitting children on 
their probability of survival, and their dependence on the endowment of their parents. 
 
We remind that a junior adult is wholly altruistic, and that his utility is proportional to the 
expected human capital accumulated by his children who will reach the adult age: 
( ) [ ]1)()(, 11 += ++ rleelU piλ . We can draw the indifference curves of this utility function in the 
plan ( )1, +el . An (anticipated) composite epidemic hitting children and such that the two 
parameters of their survival function are reduced by the same proportion, decreases their 
probability of survival )( 1+eλ  by the same percentage for all values of the spending on their 
health 1+e . Thus, the indifference curves of the parent are unchanged although each of them 
will be associated with a lower value of utility. Consequently, the junior adult will not change 
the allocation of his health spending between himself and his children when he learns that his 
children will be hit by a composite epidemic. 
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Similarly, an epidemic hitting junior adults and such that the two parameters of their survival 
function are reduced by the same proportion, decreases their probability of survival )(lpi  by 
the same percentage for all values of the spending on their health l . However, the utility of 
the junior adult will be reduced by a proportion, which will increase with the spending on his 
own health. Thus, the slopes of the indifference curves will become less steep. Consequently, 
the junior adult will reduce his spending on his own health (and will increase the spending on 
the health of his children). 
 
Finally, parents will have to bring up more children if the number of their offspring n  
increases. So, the death of a junior adult will create more orphans and its consequence will 
have become worse. This should imply a transfer of health spending from the whole of the 
children to their parents. However, under this transfer, health spending per child decreases 
first because total health spending on children has decreased, secondly because there are more 
children. This directly reduces the probability of survival of each child. The first effect is the 
stronger, except when parameter 'A  is zero, when these effects exactly balance.   
 
2.2. Demographic variables 
The population alive in period t  includes +2N  and −2N  junior adults with human capital 
endowments respectively equal to +h  and −h . It also includes +3N  and −3N  senior adults. 
Finally, it includes +1N  , −1N  children who have parents with respective human capital  +h  , 
−h , and +oN 1  , −oN 1  orphans with respectively high and low bequests. The parents of the two 
first kinds of children are the senior adults of the period. So, we have: 
(14) ++ = 31 nNN  and  −− = 31 nNN  
The populations +oN 1  , −oN 1 , +2N , −2N , +3N  and −3N  are predetermined in period t . The 
number of well-endowed (poorly-endowed) senior adults which will be alive in period 1+t  is 
equal to the number of junior adults with the same endowment who are alive in period t , time 
their rate of survival  
(15) +++
+ =
23
1 )( NlN pi ,  −−−+ = 231 )( NlN pi  
If we use equation (14) in period 1+t  (notice that the total number of children in this period is 
equal to the number of junior adults in period t  times n ), we get the equations  
(16) +
+
++
+ −=
3
1
21
1 nNnNN
o
 and −
+
−−
+ −=
3
1
21
1 nNnNN
o
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The numbers of well-endowed and poorly-endowed junior adults in period 1+t  are 
(17) ( ) ( )−−−+++++ +++= oo qcNpNeqcNpNeN 111121 )()( λλ , 
      ( ) ( ) ++−−−+++−+ −+++= 21111121 )()( NcNNecNNeN oo λλ  
 
2.3. Balance of trade and international borrowing 
In period t , human capital in the country is equal to −−++ + hNhN 22 . This expression also 
gives the quantity of health good domestically produced that is domestic output. The national 
demand for health good is −−−+++−−++ +++++ eNNeNNlNlN ào )()( 111122 . The excess of 
supply over demand is equal to the surplus of the trade balance BT . If we use equations (1), 
(2), (14), (15) and (16) we can write this surplus as 
(18) ( ) ( ) [ ]RslNslNRsNsNsNsNBT −
−
−
−
−
−
+
−
+
−
+
−
−
−
−+
−
+−−++
−+−−−−+= 11
2
111
2
11
3
1
322 ))(1())(1( pipi  
The first term represents saving by junior adults. The second term represents the disaving 
(interests included) by senior adults. The last term represents the disaving of the dead, or if 
one prefers by the orphans.  
If we use equation (13) this expression can be rewritten 
(19) ( ) ( )RsNsNsNsNBT −
−
−
−
+
−
+
−
−−++ +−+= 1
2
11
2
1
22
 
The second term of the right-hand side represents assets held by nationals at the beginning of 
period t . The first term represents assets held by nationals at the end of period t . They will be 
inflated by the factor R  at the beginning of period 1+t . Thus, national assets grow at the 
same rate as the population of junior adults. We will show that in the steady state this rate is 
lower than n , the number of children by junior adults, and we will assume that Rn < . So, the 
discounted value of national assets (debt) will tend to 0 when time increases indefinitely. 
 
3. Dynamics and long run equilibrium 
We will start by examining the equations giving the dynamics of populations. Then, in a 
second paragraph, we will investigate the properties of this dynamics, when the environment 
of the economics is kept unchanged.  
 
3.1. The dynamics of populations 
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There are +2N  and −2N  junior adults alive in period 0≥t . They will have n  children each. 
These children will either become +
+
2
2N  and −+22N  junior adults with earnings respectively 
equal to +h  and −h  in period 2+t , or they will die at the end of period 1+t . 2+D  represents 
the supplementary number of junior adults who would exist in period t  if no children die 
before reaching the age of junior adult, that is if the survival rate function λ  were identical to 
1. We will investigate the dynamics of the model for 2≥t . The states of the economy in 
periods 0 and 1 are assumed to be given.  We have the fundamental relationship: 
 
(20) 
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with 
[ ]{ }cqlplea )(1)()( 111 ++++ −+= pipiλ  
[ ]{ })1()(1)1)(()( 121 qclplea −−+−= ++++ pipiλ  
[ ]{ }cqlplea )(1)()( 112 −−−+ −+= pipiλ  
[ ]{ }))1()(1)1)(()( 122 qclplea −−+−= −−−+ pipiλ  
 
and with )0(2+N , )0(2−N  and )0(D  given if t  is even and )1(2+N , )1(2−N  and )1(D  given if 
t  is odd. 
Lemma 1, 2 and 3 imply that these parameters satisfy the constraints 10 1112 <<< aa , 
10 2122 <<< aa , 121112212 <+<+ aaaa  and 
[ ] 0)()()()()( 1121122211 >−−=− −+−+++ lleeqpcaaaa pipiλλ . 
 
The elements of each column of M  are positive and sum to 1. So they can be interpreted as 
proportions, or as conditional probabilities for instance for a child of a well-endowed junior 
adult to be well-endowed or poorly-endowed or dead two periods later.  
More precisely, 1211 aa −  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach a high 
level of human capital if his parent is well-endowed versus if his parent is poorly-endowed. 
2221 aa −  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach a low level of human 
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capital if his parents are well-endowed versus if his parents are poorly endowed. The 
difference between the probabilities for a child to die if his parents are well-endowed versus if 
his parents are poorly endowed is )()( 22211211 aaaa −−−− . The fate of children is 
independent of the social position of their parents when 022211211 =−=− aaaa . 
Matrix M  in period t  only depends on health spending set by junior adults, +l , −l , ++1e  and 
−
+1e . These spending are functions of the values taken by a series of exogenous variables in 
period t : the foreign interest rate R , the parameters of the survival functions of children and 
young adults A , 'A , B , 'B , α  and β  , the incomes of the junior adults +h and −h  and the 
number of their children n .  
 
Equation (20) gives the dynamics of the numbers of junior adults and of the dead, +2N , −2N  
and D  for 2≥t , when the values of these variables are given in periods 0 and 1. Equation 
(15) gives the dynamics of the numbers of senior adults +
−
++
=
2
1
3 )( NlN pi ,  −
−
−−
=
2
1
3 )( NlN pi  
for 1≥t . Equation (14) gives the dynamics of the number of non orphan children ++ = 31 nNN  
and −− = 31 nNN  for 1≥t . Finally, the numbers of orphans in period 1≥t  are given by 
equations (16) +
+
++
+ −=
3
1
21
1 nNnNN
o
 and −
+
−−
+ −=
3
1
21
1 nNnNN
o
. 
We define DNNP ++= −+ 22   as the potential population of junior adults. It would be equal 
to the effective population if all children reached the age of junior adult. Equation (20) shows 
that this potential population grows at rate n : 222 nPP =+ . The number of dead people is equal 
to the difference between the potential population and the number of junior adults: 
)( 22 −+ +−= NNPD . Thus, we just have to investigate the dynamics of the numbers of living 
junior adults +2N  and −2N , which is given by 
(21) 
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with )0(2+N  and )0(2−N  given if t  is even and )1(2+N  and )1(2−N  given if t  is odd. In the 
rest of the paper we will assume that t  is even. 
 
3.2. Characterization of the demographic dynamics  
We will assume in this section that all the parameters and exogenous variables stay constant 
over time for 0≥t . We will also assume that t  is even. Then, matrix M  will stay constant 
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over time, and the dynamics of the model will be limited to the sizes of the various 
components of population (including the dead). Let us introduce the new variable 
 (22) 04)()(4)( 2112222112112221122211 >+−=−−+≡∆ aaaaaaaaaa  
We have the lemma 
Lemma 4. a) The eigenvalues of matrix 'M , 1ρ  and 2ρ , are real and such that 
01 21 >>> ρρ . Their expressions are  
(23) 2/)( 22111 ∆++= aaρ   and 2/)( 22112 ∆−+= aaρ  
 
b) Let us denote by 





=
21
11
1
v
v
V and 





=
22
12
2
v
v
V  the right-hand column eigenvectors of  'M  and 
by ( )21 VVV =  the matrix of these eigenvectors. A determination of these eigenvectors is  
(24) 





∆++−∆+−
−
=
11221122
1212 22
aaaa
aa
V  
1V  can be normed such that its components are positive and sum to 1. 2V can be normed such 
that its first component is negative, its second component is positive and the sum of both 
components is equal to 1. 
 
c) Let 





=
2221
1211
ww
ww
W  be the inverse of V : IVW = . Then, we have  
(25) 
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






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∆++−
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121122
121122
12 2
2
4
1
aaa
aaa
a
W  
 
d) The elements of matrix W  satisfy the constraints  
(26) 01211 >> ww  and 2221 0 ww <<  
 
The proof is in the appendix. We can now establish the following crucial proposition which 
neatly characterizes the demographic dynamics and the evolution of human capital (and thus 
income) distributions over time. 
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Proposition 1. Assume, to fix the ideas,  that )0()0( 22 −+ + NN =1. Then: 
a) The dynamic paths followed by the sizes of the cohorts of both kinds of junior adults, are 
linear combinations of two geometric series with rates equal to the growth rate of potential 
population n  times  the eigenvalues of matrix 'M   
(27) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ])0()0()0()0()2( 2222211212/22122111112/12 −++−+++ +++=+ NwNwvnNwNwvntN tt ρρ  
(28) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ])0()0()0()0()2( 2222212212/22122112112/12 −++−++− +++=+ NwNwvnNwNwvntN tt ρρ  
In the long run the populations of both kinds of junior adults will grow at a rate equal to the 
growth rate of the  potential population of junior adults times  the largest eigenvalue of 
matrix 'M  (which is smaller than 1). The long run size of each group depends on the initial 
condition, )0(2+N . However, the long run proportions of the two groups of junior adults are 
independent of the initial conditions, and are precisely proportional to the two components of 
the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of matrix 'M . 
 
b) Let us assume that its share of junior adults holding a high level of human capital in the 
initial population is decreased. In the long run, the sizes of both groups of junior adults will 
drop. In the short run, the number of junior adults holding a high level of human capital and 
the total size of the population of junior adults will unambiguously go down. In contrast, the 
number of junior adults holding a low level of human capital may increase in the short run. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 1 has several important implications, which will be 
illustrated later on in our application to epidemics next section. First of all, Property a) shows 
the ability of the model to generate hysteresis. This should not be though seen as a surprising 
result: this is a natural outcome in demographic models: initial demographic shocks are likely 
to have long lasting echo effects. Such effects may be dampened after a while, for example if 
fertility markedly changes some generations after the initial shock, but it seems out of 
question that persistence is a fundamental property of demographic dynamics. Second, our 
model features that an initial change in the income distribution of the population may distort 
this distribution in the short and medium terms but not in the long run. This is a very 
important property as we will see in the application to epidemics. Actually, one of the debates 
around AIDS (especially in sub-Saharan Africa) is its impact on income inequality either in 
the short or long run. Our benchmark model delivers a very clear message in this respect as 
explained hereafter.  
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4. The demographic and economic effects of epidemics  
We define an epidemic as an increase in the death rate of a generation of people lasting for 
only one period. Two kinds of epidemics will be considered in this paper. We shall study 
analytically in detail the impact of epidemics of the first kind, that is those lowering 
simultaneously and by the same magnitude the two parameters of the survival probabilities 
( A  and 'A  for children, and B  and 'B  for young adults). We then move to the epidemics of 
the second kind, which we analyze qualitatively so as to unburden the exposition. As one can 
deduce from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the dynamics induced by an epidemic of the third kind 
are qualitatively very similar to those following an epidemic of the first kind, at least for 
epidemics hitting young adults. Therefore, we disregard them. 
An epidemic hits people irrespectively of their endowment in human capital or of their social 
background.7.  We will assume that nothing can be done against the epidemic itself, although 
an increase in health spending will reduce the number of death the epidemic causes. Finally, 
we shall only consider one-period long epidemics occurring in period 0. Longer 
epidemiological shocks would complicate tremendously the analytical treatment. As we shall 
see, one-period long shocks are enough to capture the main mechanisms at work in the model 
and to identify the outcomes of an epidemic of a given kind and age-profile of mortality.  
In all cases, we will start from a reference balanced growth path with a total population of 
junior adults equal to 1. We first define precisely such a balanced path. We can deduce from 
the expressions of matrices V and W  given in Lemma 4 that 121121111 =+ vwvw , and 
021221121 =+ vwvw . Assume that the initial population of junior adults, )0()0( 22 −+ + NN , is 
equal to 1, and suppose we norm eigenvector 1V   in such a way that the sum of its two 
components is equal to 1. If the vector of the initial values of the populations of the two kinds 
of junior adults is equal to the eigenvector of the transition matrix associated to its largest 
eigenvalue 12
2
)0(
)0( V
N
N
=







−
+
,  the population of junior adults will follow the balanced growth 
path  
                                                 
7
 The assumption that the reduction in the probability of survival is the same for junior adults with a high as with 
a low level of human capital is debatable. There are indications that people with a relatively high schooling level 
are more exposed to the risk of being hit by AIDS because they have more sexual partners (Cogneau and Grimm, 
2005). There are also indications that these people are more aware of the risks of AIDS than less educated people 
and understand faster the usefulness of not engaging in risky behaviour, for instance they are more responsive to 
campaigns of information, and prevention (de Walque, 2004).The United Nations (2004) quotes several studies 
showing that poor and uneducated people are more likely to engage in risky behaviour and to acquire HIV/AIDS. 
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Proposition 1 shows that this steady state is relatively asymptotically stable. This will be our 
reference balanced growth path. We now move to our analysis of epidemics. For a better 
understanding, recall that total domestic output in our model is given by  
 
(30) −−++ += htNhtNtY )()()( 22  . 
 
4.1. Epidemics of the first kind 
4.1.1. An epidemic hitting children 
The epidemic takes place in period 0 and kills a given proportion of children. So, the 
population of junior adults alive in period 1 will be reduced by the same proportion. However, 
the ratio between the numbers of well-endowed and poorly endowed junior adults will be 
unchanged. The second effect will be that the population of junior adults will be reduced by a 
constant proportion in every odd period by the children, grandchildren, etc. who will not be 
born because of the death of their forebear. Domestic output will be reduced by the same 
proportion in odd periods.  
Let us investigate the problem at a more formal level. The value of parameters A  and 'A  are 
decreased in a way such that 0'/'/ <= AdAAdA  in period 0. Under this assumption, even if 
the epidemic has been perfectly anticipated when junior adults set their investment decisions, 
they would have not changed these decisions in front of this information. Equations (20) and 
(21) show that matrix 'M  is reduced by a factor AdA /)1( α−  in period 0. So, the populations 
of both kinds of junior adults in every odd period starting in period 1 is reduced by the same 
proportion. These populations remain unchanged in even periods. 
Equations (14), (15) and (16) show that in odd periods the numbers of senior adults and of 
children of each category, are unchanged. These numbers are reduced by the factor 
AdA /)1( α−  in even periods starting in period 2. The only demographic change in period 0 is 
the death of children caused by the epidemic. Thus, the third consequence of the epidemic of 
period 0 is an echo effect, which permanently changes the demographic structure of the 
population. The share of junior adults is reduced in every odd period and increased in every 
even period. Thus, even if domestic output per worker remains the same in these periods, 
domestic output per capita decreases in odd periods and increases in even periods.   
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 As we can see, such an epidemic has some important demographic and economic effects 
either in the short or long run by inducing a permanent demographic composition effect and a 
change in output per capita (but not per worker). Nonetheless, the epidemic is shown to be 
neutral at all temporal horizons in terms of the income distribution among junior adults. The 
next section shows that ‘adult’ epidemics can in contrast distort such a distribution. 
 
4.1.2. An epidemic hitting junior adults 
The epidemic takes place in period 0 and kills a proportion of junior adults at the end of the 
period.  The number of children alive in period 1 will be unchanged but the proportion of 
orphans among them will be higher. The number of senior adults alive in period 1 will be 
lower as a result of the epidemic.  
Let us investigate the problem at a more formal level. Since the epidemic is of the first kind, 
we are in the situation in which B  and 'B  are decreased in a way such that 
0'/'/ <= BdBBdB  in period 0. Junior adults living in this period perfectly understand the 
consequences of the epidemic when they make their decisions. According to lemma 2, they 
will reduce their investment in their own health, and their survival rates at the end of the 
period will decrease by more than what results from the epidemic. Junior adults will also 
increase their investment in the health of their children in period 1, which will improve the 
survival rates of children in period 1. Thus, matrix 'M  has been changed in period 0, and 
consequently the populations of junior adults in period 2. The relative variations in the 
populations of juniors adults holding a high level and a low level of human capital, in this 
period is  
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The relative changes in the total population of junior adults and in the domestic output per 
worker are 
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The following lemma is an extension of lemmas 2 and 3. 
Lemma 5. Let us consider a junior adult with endowment h , and a decrease in the 
coefficients of his survival function by 0'/'/ <= BdBBdB . His probability of survival and the 
probability of survival of each of his children will change by 
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Proof.  See the appendix. 
 
An epidemic decreases the probability of survival of junior adults, first because it increases 
the death rate of this population, secondly because it reduces the spending of this population 
on its own health. This epidemic increases the probability of survival of children 
(conditionally on the facts that they are orphans or that their parents are alive) because parents 
spend more on the health of their children. The following lemma will be used in the proof of 
Proposition 2. 
 
Lemma 6. Consider a junior adult with endowment h  who invests l  in his own health. When 
parameters c  and q  change, the expression  
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has a positive lower bound E  and an upper bound E smaller than 1. 
Proof.  See the appendix. 
 
The following proposition will give the changes, taking place in period 2, in the total 
population of junior adults, and in the population of workers holding, respectively, a high 
level and a low level of human capital, induced by an epidemic taking place in period 0.  
 
Proposition 2. If the reduction in the probability of survival of orphans, c−1 , and if the 
probability for an orphan to reach a high level of human capital, q , are low enough, we have 
the following results. 
a) In period 2 the total population of junior adults increases. 
b) The population of junior adults holding a high level of human capital decreases, and the 
population of junior adults with a low level of human capital increases. Thus, the proportion 
of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in the total population increases. 
Consequently, domestic output per worker decreases. 
c) The numbers of each kind of children and senior adults are unchanged. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. When an epidemic takes place, well-endowed junior adults will 
spend more on the health of their children. This will contribute to increasing the proportion of 
these children who will survive in period 2. However, more of these children will grow as 
orphans whose the probability of survival is reduced by a factor c−1 . If c is near enough to 1, 
the first effect will dominate and the number of junior adults alive in period 2 will be higher.  
 
In period 2, the number of junior adults who were orphans will increase and the number of 
those who were brought up by their parents will decrease. If the probability for an orphan to 
reach a high level of human capital, q , is low enough, the number of junior adults with a high 
level of human capital, alive in period 2, will become lower. The two assumptions of 
Proposition 2 mean that orphans are more disadvantaged in their probability of reaching a 
high level of human capital than in their probability of dying before adult age.  
 
Proposition 2 is a crucial characterisation of the medium term distributional effects of ‘adult’ 
epidemics. In contrast to the epidemic only killing children, considered before, the 
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distributional consequences are significant in the medium run. More young adults will get less 
educated two periods after the epidemic and output per worker goes down: the economy is 
clearly impoverished (with respect to the reference balanced growth path) at this time 
horizon8. Thus, the demographic and economic effects are clearly much more potentially 
dangerous when the epidemic hits junior adults than when it only affects children.  
The analysis of periods posterior to period 2 is cumbersome. We know that, in the long run, 
the shares of junior adults holding respectively a high level and a low level of human capital 
that is the income distribution will go back to their balanced growth values. So, in contrast to 
some contributions in the AIDS-related literature (like Bell et al., 2003), the model predicts a 
kind of  corrective dynamics which will bring some key variables to the corresponding 
balanced growth corresponding values. But we cannot even conclude on the long run change 
in the total population of junior adults without further assumptions.  However, we can note 
that just like ‘child’ epidemics and for the same reasons, we have some permanent effects, 
notably on the demographic composition of the economy.  
 
4.2. Epidemics of the second kind 
To unburden the presentation, we shall discuss the implications of the epidemics of the second 
kind in qualitative terms. Of course, the algebra involved is pretty much similar to the 
previous analysis. 
 
4.2.1. Epidemics hitting children 
The dynamics induced will depend closely on whether the parents of the children will 
anticipate or not  in t=-1  the shock taking place in t=0. In the case where the shock is 
unanticipated, we get a similar picture as the one depicted in Section 4.1.1 devoted to 
epidemics of the first kind hitting children. But the shock might be perfectly anticipated: it 
could be so in the case of a chronic disease (like malaria) or because the economy has been 
experiencing an epidemic hitting adults before t=0, which is likely to be transmitted to 
children (like AIDS). Let us isolate here the impact of the epidemic hitting children at t=0, 
anticipated by their parents one period before. In such a case, as documented in Lemma 2 and 
Lemma 3, the parents will spend less on their own health and more on the health of their 
children. This implies less senior adults in t=0 and more orphans too. In t=1, the number of 
                                                 
8
 However, the share of the active population in the total population increases and we do not know if output per 
capita increases or decreases.  
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senior adults is unchanged, and so is the number of children in the same period (since the 
number of young adults in t=0 is not affected by the epidemic).  However, the number of 
young adults generally diminishes in t=1. In effect, more orphans in t=0 means less young 
adults in t=1, and such an induced drop  should be added to the direct effect of the epidemic 
killing a proportion of children in t=0.  On the other side, if the parents anticipate the 
epidemic in t=0 and spend more on the health of their children, then the survival probability of 
children is higher, which tends to increase the number of junior adults in t=1. The latter effect 
is generally dominated by the two former negative effects, including the direct one. 
Henceforth, the number of junior adults should drop in period t=1, leading to a further drop in 
the number of children and senior adults in t=2. However, the number of junior adults in 
unchanged in period t=2, since the number of children at t= 1 and their survival probability is 
unaffected by the initial shock and its further consequences. 
Therefore except the fact that the number of senior adults should also drop in t=0 in contrast 
to the epidemic of the first kind hitting children for which such a figure starts to fall from t=2, 
we have qualitatively the same kind of demographic dynamics as in Section 4.1.1: The 
epidemics of the first and second kind hitting children at t=0 induce a permanent demographic 
restructuring with the proportion of junior adults rising in even periods and decreasing in odd 
periods. 
Nonetheless, in sharp contrast to the epidemic of the first kind, the current epidemic 
configuration has short and medium term distributional effects. Even fully anticipated, an 
epidemic of the first kind hitting children will not affect the income distribution because the 
investment decisions of the junior adults are unaltered. However, an epidemic of the second 
kind does alter such investment decisions if it is anticipated one period behind: junior adults at 
t=-1 will invest more on the health of their children and less on themselves. The situation is 
quite similar to the one algebraically investigated in Section 4.1.2 above which impact two 
periods after the shock is summarized by Proposition 2: under the same conditions, that it is if 
orphans are more penalized in the access to a high level of human capital than in terms of 
survival rates, the proportion of unskilled junior adults or workers will drop in t=1, leading to 
the fall of output per worker in this period.  
 
Thus while the two epidemics share almost the same qualitative demographic impact, the 
short and medium term economic and distributional are quite different in the case where the 
epidemics are anticipated by the parents. In particular, an anticipated epidemic of the second 
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kind hitting children has a negative distributional effect in t=1 while the epidemic of the first 
kind, even fully anticipated, has none.  
 
4.2.2. Epidemics hitting young adults 
In contrast to epidemics of the first kind hitting young adults at t=0, the latter will not react by 
cutting their health expenditures and increasing those of their children: they will do just the 
contrary. Nonetheless, this will not reverse all the results stated in Proposition 2. In effect, 
even if the young adults increase their health expenditures, the induced gain in life expectancy 
is generally not sufficient to compensate the decrease in the number of young adults directly 
caused by the epidemic in t=0. Henceforth, while we will have more young adults surviving in 
t=1 and therefore less orphans compared to the case studied in Section 4.1.2, we will still have 
less senior adults and more orphans in t=1 compared to the benchmark balanced growth path. 
The situation is definitely worse in t=2: in contrast to ``adults’’ epidemics of the first kind, 
since the young adults in t=0 will invest less in the health of their children, we will have 
unambiguously less junior adults in t=2. The proportion of unskilled junior adults will also 
increase (compared to the balanced growth path) exactly as in epidemic shocks studied in the 
two previous sections, which lowers again output per worker in t=2. 
 
It seems therefore crystal clear that the epidemics of the second kind generally lead to a more 
negative evolution either from the demographic or economic point of view. In particular, a 
striking difference between the two epidemics is that while the epidemic of the first kind 
increases the number of junior adults in t=2, the epidemic of the second kind induces just the 
contrary. It is now time to switch to a more factual evidence to substantiate the discussion.  
 
4.3. Discussion 
In order to give a focused discussion, we shall concentrate on the short and  medium-term 
dynamics, say for example the outcomes at t=1,2. The long-run equilibrium has been already 
studied in Section 3.2, and its properties summarized in Proposition 1. We shall also start with 
some demographic projections in the AIDS case to discriminate between the theoretical cases 
studied above. 9 
 
                                                 
9
 By doing so, we have not in mind any kind of calibration or purposive empirical work. Of course, the fact that 
for analytical tractability we only consider one-period shocks does not allow for such a task. 
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4.3.1. Demographic projections in the AIDS case 
Fortunately, the disagreement on the economic impact of AIDS does not extend to the 
demographers, at least for the medium term horizon. HIV/AIDS primarily affects the most 
productive age group of men and women between 15 and 49 years—the main breadwinners 
and heads of households raising families and supporting the elderly—and their children. All 
studies conclude that the total population of countries severely hit by AIDS will be much lower 
in 20 or 25 years than if the epidemic had not taken place. Figure 1 (United Nations, 200410) 
presents the projected population size from 1995 to 2025, taking into account the demographic 
impact of AIDS as well as the hypothetical projected population without AIDS, for the 38 most 
affected African countries. In 1995, their population stood at 553 million, 6 million less than it 
would have been without AIDS. By 2025, the population of these 38 African countries will 
reach 983 million, that is, 156 million (or 14 per cent) fewer than without AIDS. This number 
can be decomposed between 98 million additional deaths between 1995 and 2025, and 58 
million children who will not be born because of the early deaths of women of reproductive 
age. In the most severe case, Botswana, where currently more than one in three adults is HIV 
positive, population is expected to decline within the next few years 
 
Death affects more the adult population of working age than younger or older populations. 
However, the same study by the United Nations writes “Approximately one fourth to one third 
of children born to HIV-positive women are likely to acquire infection from their mothers.  
Paediatric HIV infection is expected to have a substantial impact on mortality during infancy 
and childhood, particularly among older children (above age one)… Children who acquire the 
HIV virus from their mothers during childbirth or breast feeding usually do not survive long 
                                                 
10
 We can read in this report: “In World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision (United Nations, Sales N° 
E.03XIII.6), the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs Population Division incorporated 
the impact of AIDS into the estimates and projections of the population of 53 countries…  They are compared 
with hypothetical estimates and projections that make no allowance for the existence of AIDS. The latter are 
derived from the application of the Population Division standard projection program on the basis of assumptions 
regarding the future course of mortality that are similar to and consistent with those made with respect to 
countries that are still largely free from the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The process to derive estimates and projections 
that explicitly incorporate the effect of HIV/AIDS is more complex and made in several steps… In many of the 
investigated countries, the prevalence of HIV was still rising at the time of the most recent observation. In most 
such cases, the projections assume that HIV prevalence will peak sometimes during the period 2002-2020. In 
about half of the countries, the peak prevalence is estimated to have occurred already, between 1993 and 2001.  
However, in some of those cases the evidence remains weak that prevalence had indeed passed its peak…  
Thereafter, prevalence levels are assumed to decline in a manner consistent with modifications of behaviour that 
reduce the rates of recruitment into high-risk groups and the chance of infection among those engaging in high-
risk behaviour.”  
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enough to enrol in school…. Children die young from HIV owing to mother-to-child 
transmission and to the weakened ability of infected mothers to care for their infants and 
young children”. Cohen (1998) notes on Southern Africa: “Infant mortality rates are already 
rising sharply in countries with mature epidemics. Children born to mothers who are HIV 
positive have a 30-60% chance of becoming positive themselves… It is estimated that two-
thirds of AIDS-deaths will occur in children aged 1-4 years… Child mortality rates are already 
higher today than they would have been without AIDS in some high prevalence countries. 
Thus child mortality rates are estimated as being 75% higher in Botswana in 1996. By the year 
2010 child mortality rates are expected to be twice as high in Botswana, 4 times greater in 
Zimbabwe and about twice as high in Zambia and Malawi” (Figure 2).  
Finally, Figure 3 (United Nations, 2004) displays the age pyramid of Botswana, the country 
with the highest adult HIV prevalence, in 2000 and as projected for 2025, with and without 
AIDS. In 2000, the impact of AIDS on the age structure of Botswana’s population is still 
mild. But by 2025, more than half of the potential population aged 35-59 would have been 
lost to AIDS. In comparison, one third of the population aged less than 15 years old is 
expected to be lost to AIDS. Cohen (2002) notes that for Malawi one of the most important 
consequences of AIDS is a change in the age pyramid of the population, with a narrowing of 
the distribution in the working age population, and a consequent problem with respect to age 
dependency, with larger numbers of youthful and elderly dependents.  
 
With these “stylized” demographic facts in mind, we shall examine now the adequacy and 
predictions of our theory.  To this end, we will consider an epidemic hitting simultaneously 
children and young adults, which will incidentally allow us to provide a synthesis of the 
properties established in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. To fit even better the demographic exposition 
just above, we shall consider epidemics hitting more young adults than children, and examine 
the implications for t=1, 2. 
 
4.3.2. Testing the theory 
We shall test the theory on four points, two demographic aspects (population size, age 
pyramid), and two economic (output and productivity indicators, income distribution).  
 
a) Population size: Putting together the implications of epidemics of the first kind hitting 
children and adults at t=0, one gets a quite counter-factual picture. In the short run, say 
 31
t=1, the epidemic hitting children mechanically decreases the number of junior adults 
while keeping unaltered the numbers of senior adults and children. Therefore, overall 
the total effect of this epidemic is a decrease in the size of the population at t=1. On 
the other hand, the epidemic hitting junior adults only modifies the number of senior 
adults in t=1. So putting together both shocks, we have a clearly declining population 
size in t=1, which is correct. However, in t=2, we get the counter-factual prediction: 
while the epidemic hitting children decreases the size of the population (both the 
number of children and senior adults decline whereas the number of junior adults is 
unaltered), the epidemic hitting adults does the contrary since the number of junior 
adults gets increased in t=2 under this epidemic (See proposition 2). Henceforth, if we 
assume consistently with the AIDS evidence that the mortality impact of the epidemic 
is stronger on junior adults than on children, we get a counter-factual overall effect, 
that is an increase in the population size in the medium-run (t=2), driven by the 
increase in the number of junior adults in the period, which is itself due to the increase 
in the investment in the health of children following the shock at the end of the period 
t=0. 
In contrast, the epidemic of the second kind entails the opposite optimal investment 
response under adult epidemics: more health expenditures for junior adults at the 
expense of health expenditures on children. As a consequence, the key mechanism 
yielding the counter-factual prediction above is just reversed, and we get a much more 
satisfactory picture if we want to replicate AIDS medium-term demographic impact. 
This property is confirmed in the next point. 
 
b) Age pyramid: In the short run (t=1), the epidemics of the first and second kind both 
imply a reduction in the proportion of young adults, which is also a key economic 
implications since these adults are also the workers of the economy.11 The crucial 
difference between the epidemics arises in t=2 for the same reason as before. While 
the epidemic of the first kind (hitting adults) entails a mechanism inducing an increase 
in the number of young adults in t=2, and therefore a counter-factual age pyramid, the 
                                                 
11
 Note that in our case, this property is a non-trivial consequence of a shock which takes place in the initial 
period. Naturally, a lasting epidemic like AIDS has additionally a direct effect on the demographic composition 
at t=2. 
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epidemic of the second kind does not and fits much better the medium-term age 
pyramid in Figure 3.  
 
c) Output and productivity: In contrast to the demographic indicators studied above, 
the epidemics of first and second kind both predict  the worsening of economic 
performance in the short and medium run. This could be easily captured by declining 
output per capita or output per worker or possibly both in t=1 and t=2. A nice feature 
of the theory is that even in the case where the working population is rising, which 
happens to be the case of adult epidemics of the second kind in period t=2, this 
demographic ``advantage” is offset  by the increasing proportion of unskilled, which 
leads output per worker to fall down. 
 
d) Income distribution: The same type of conclusions can be reached for distributional 
effects. While only the epidemic of the second kind has a (probably slight) 
distributional effect in the short run, that is t=1, both have such a consequence in the 
medium term, when t=2. Adult epidemics, either of the first or second kind, do trigger 
an increase in the proportion of unskilled junior adults in t=2, which features an 
unambiguous impoverishment of the economies in the medium run. It should be 
clearly noted at this point that this property of the model derives from the singularity 
of a rising category under epidemics, orphans. Under our working assumptions (see in 
particular Proposition 2), that it is if orphans are more penalized in the access to a high 
level of human capital than in terms of survival rates, which seems quite reasonable, 
they will necessarily lead to the medium-term increase in the proportion of unskilled. 
The recent demographic evidence on the quickly rising number orphans is therefore of 
crucial importance: if not conveniently treated (for example by internationally funded 
social aid programs for orphans), this problem is likely to induce a sharp worsening of 
poverty in the medium run. 
 
5. Concluding: does fertility matter? 
In our model, we have taken fertility as exogenous. This is done in order to get an analytical 
representation of demographic and economic dynamics at any period. On a theoretical ground, 
a persistent decline in life expectancy can increase or decrease fertility depending on parental 
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preferences and on the way mortality is specified (see Hazan and Zoaby, 2006, for a purely 
theoretical argument). Indeed, a sharp increase in child mortality (which happens under AIDS 
for example) may give rise to an insurance effect leading to a rise in fertility. On the other 
hand, a Barro-Becker model (1989) where mothers can freely supply labor would feature that 
under a massive drop in labour supply, female participation in the labor market will shift 
upward, implying a decrease in fertility. Empirically, the debate is even less clear (see Young, 
2005, versus Kalemli-Ozcan, 2006, in the AIDS case). In this paper, we have adopted the 
viewpoint of most demographers on the fertility behaviour response to AIDS: By the time 
most HIV infected women die, they would already have given birth to several children. Hence, 
fertility response to epidemics like AIDS could be actually quite limited. Indeed, many 
surveys report a lack of awareness of AIDS among the infected people themselves in sub-
Saharan Africa who seldom drastically modify their sexual behavior (see Kalemli-Ozcan, 
2006). 
Of course, this should not be an excuse to not take the further step of endogenizing fertility in 
our general theory of dynamics and income distribution under epidemics. Of course, this 
would be done at the expense of some of the directions taken in the current paper (for 
example, the tractability of medium term dynamics). But the extension seems highly 
promising. We shall illustrate its relevance by a simple exercise on the current model. 
Suppose that a junior adult living in period 0 has, at the end of this period, a number of 
children reduced by the amount 0<dn . In the following periods fertility will be restored to its 
initial level. We will assume that value of parameter 'A  is zero to make the computations 
almost immediate. Under this assumption, Lemma 2 and 3 establish that this junior adult will 
keep his spending on his own health and on the whole of his children unchanged. So, a junior 
adult with an endowment of human capital +h  will increase his investment in the health of 
each of his children by 0/11 >−= ++++ ndnede . The probability of survival of this child will 
increase by 0/)()1(/)()1()( 11111 >−−=−= ++++++++++ ndneedeeed λαλαλ  . 
The number of junior adults alive in period 2 will change in reaction to two opposite effects. It 
will tend to decrease because of the lower number of children born at the end of period 0, but 
it will tend to increase because parents will spend more on the health of each of their children.  
We can compute the total effect by differentiating equation (21) 
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If we use equation (20) we get  
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So, the consequence of a decrease in fertility in period 0 will be to reduce the population of 
both kinds of senior adults in period 2 and every following even period by the proportion 
ndn /α . The ratio between the numbers of well-endowed and poorly endowed junior adults 
will be unchanged, but the population of junior adults will be reduced by a constant 
proportion in every even period. The numbers of senior adults and of children of each category 
will be reduced by the factor ndn /α  in odd periods starting in period 3. The only 
demographic change in period 1 will be the reduction in the number of children resulting from 
the decrease in fertility. So, the share of junior adults in the total population is reduced in 
every even period and increased in every odd period. Thus, even if the domestic output per 
worker remains the same in these periods, domestic output per capita decreases in even 
periods and increases in odd periods.   
 
In our exercise, the negative fertility shock has a clear negative impact on the size of the 
population at least in even periods, but no effect at all on income distribution and investment 
choices. The latter property is not the expected outcome in a Barro-Becker framework where 
the quantity/quality of children trade-off  is key. This should be the next step of our research 
in the topic. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
 a) The eigenvalues of matrix 'M  are the roots of the characteristic equation  
0)()()( 2112221122112 =−++−≡Λ aaaaaaS ρρ
 
The discriminant of this equation is 0>∆ . So, the two eigenvalues of 'M  are distinct and 
real. Their product is given by 0)0( 21122211 >−≡ aaaaS . Moreover we have  
21122211211222112211 )1)(1()()(1)1( aaaaaaaaaaS −−−=−++−≡  
As we have 21111 aa >−  and 12221 aa >− , we can conclude that 0)1( >S . Thus, the two 
eigenvalues of matrix 'M  are strictly included between 0 and 1.  
 
b) We have 
( ) 21121111111112211 2/ vavavvaa +==∆++ ρ , so  
( ) 2112111122 2 vavaa =∆+−  
We also have  
( ) 2212121122 2 vavaa =∆−−  
So, a determination of the eigenvectors is given by equation (24). The two components of 1V  
are positive and we can norm this eigenvector by setting 12111 =+ vv . Moreover the sum of the 
two components of 2V  is positive and we can norm this eigenvector by setting 12212 =+ vv  
 
c) We deduce from IVW =  
1)(2 211112 =− wwa  
0)(2 221212 =− wwa  
0)())(( 211121111122 =+∆+−− wwwwaa  
1)())(( 221222121122 =+∆+−− wwwwaa  
so 0
4
1
12
2211
11 >
−+∆
∆
=
a
aa
w  and 0
2
1
12 >∆
=w  
and 0
4
1
12
2211
21 <
−+∆−
∆
=
a
aa
w  and 0
2
1
22 >∆
=w  
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d) The inequalities are easy to check. For example, 1211 ww >   is equivalent to 
)(2 112212 aaa −+>∆ . A sufficient condition for this inequality is   
)(4)(4)( 1122121221122211222211 aaaaaaaaaa −++−>+−≡∆ , or  
22122111 aaaa +>+ , which is true.  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 a) Let Ρ  be the diagonal matrix with elements 1ρ  and 2ρ . Then (21) can be rewritten 
 








Ρ=






Ρ=






=







+
+
−
+
+
−
+
−
+
−
+
)0(
)0()()(
)(
)(
)(
')2(
)2(
2
2
12/
2
2
2
2
2
2
N
NWnV
tN
tNWnV
tN
tN
nM
tN
tN t
 
In the long run, under 1)0()0( 22 =+ −+ NN , we have 
( ) [ ]12212111112/12 )0()(/)2( wNwwvntN
t
t +−→+ +
∞→
++ ρ  
( ) [ ]12212112112/12 )0()(/)2( wNwwvntN
t
t +−→+ +
∞→
+
− ρ  
This establishes directly property a).  
 
b) The dynamics of populations can be written 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]22222211212/212212111112/12 )0()()0()()2( wNwwvnwNwwvntN tt +−++−=+ +++++ ρρ  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]22222212212/212212112112/12 )0()()0()()2( wNwwvnwNwwvntN tt +−++−=+ ++++− ρρ  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]2222221221212/21221211211112/1
22
)0()()()0()()(
)2()2(
wNwwvvnwNwwvvn
tNtN
tt +−+++−+
=+++
++++
−+
ρρ
 
 
We know from Lemma 4d that 01211 >> ww , and 2221 0 ww << . Lemma 4b established that 
0,, 222111 >vvv , 012 <v , and 02212 >+ vv  also hold.   
Now notice that, if )0(2+N  is decreased, then )2(2 ++ tN  should go down.  As 21 ρρ > , 
)2()2( 22 +++ −+ tNtN  drops too if 0))(())(( 2221221212112111 ≥−++−+ wwvvwwvv . The 
expressions of matrices V and W given in Lemma 4 show that the left-hand side of this 
inequality is equal to 0. However, we do not know if )2(2 +− tN  increases or decreases in the 
short run. Indeed, by the same reasoning as just before, this figure would go down if  
0)()( 222122121121 ≥−+− wwvwwv .  Unfortunately this expression turns out to be equal to 
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( )∆− 124 a , which is negative. Therefore anything could happen in the short run as for the 
number of low human capital junior adults. □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 5 
We deduce from equation (15)  
lh
dl
e
de
−
−=
+
+
1
1
.  
We deduce from equation (12)  
( ) ( ) 02'
')/('1
'
)1)(1(
'
2
'
')/('
1 <





++−
+
++
−=
+
−−
=
+






−−+
+
++
− B
dB
BBl
BhBARnBA
B
dB
BBlr
BBl
Bdl
BBl
BhBARnBA
βαββα
βαβ
β
. 
If we differentiate equation (8) and use the previous equation, we get equation (35). We 
deduce from equation (7) 
( )
')/(')(
'1
'
)1()(
)(
1
1
1
1
BBl
Bdl
ARnBAlhB
BBl
AAe
Ade
e
ed
++−
+
−−=
+
−=
+
+
+
+ ααλ
λ
 
If we substitute the above expression of ldl /  we get equation (36).  
 
Proof of Lemma 6 
Equation (5) and the conditions on the parameters imply that r  is positive and has an upper 
bound. Moreover, Lemma 1 established that hl <<0 . The second expression of E  
establishes 
( ) ( )
)/('
)'(1
')/('
1
)/('
'1
')/('
10
2222
ARnBA
BBh
rBhBARnBA
E
ARnBABh
B
rBhBARnBA
ββ αα −− +
++
−
<<
+++
−
<  
Each of the two factors appearing in the first expression of E  are smaller than 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
a) The change in the number of junior adults living in period 2, whose parents held a high 
level of human capital is, according to equation (20) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )++++
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
++
++
+





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




+−
=+−=+
1
1
1
1
1
12111
)1(
)1(
e
e
ed
c
l
ld
e
ed
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ccledaad
λλ
λ
pi
pi
λ
λ
pi
piλ
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We use equation (36) and get  
( )
( )( ) ( )[ ][ ] ( )[ ]( ) ( )
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Equation (35) shows that ( ) 02111 >+ aad  is equivalent to 
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We use equation (14) and get 
 
( )( ) ( )
( ) 





+−
+
−
−
−
++
+
−<












+−
+
−
−
−
++
+
−−−
++
+
+
+
++
+
+
+
+
)/(')(
'
1
11)/(''
'1
)/(')(
'
1
11)/(''
'111
ARnBAlhB
BBl
ARnBABBh
BBl
c
ARnBAlhB
BBl
ARnBABBh
BBl
cl
β
α
α
β
α
αpi
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )+++
++
+
+
+
+






−
+=






+−
+
−
−
−
++
+
−





−
+<
lhE
lc
c
ARnBAlhB
BBl
ARnBABBh
BBl
lc
c
,
1
1
1
)/(')(
'
1
11)/(''
'11
1
11
pi
β
α
α
pi
 
 
Lemma 6 shows that ( )++ lhE ,  has a positive lower bound. So, for c  near enough to 1, the 
inequality is satisfied. 
A similar computation shows that ( ) 02212 >+ aad . Then, equation (33) establishes part a of 
the proposition.  
b) We have 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }cqcqpledad +−= +++ )(11 piλ  
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Equation (35) shows that ( ) 011 <ad  is equivalent to 
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We use equation (14) and get 
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According to lemma 6, a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is 
( ) Elcqp
cq 111 <
−
+
+pi
, with 1/1 >E  
For q  near enough to 0, the inequality is satisfied. A similar computation shows that 
( ) 012 <ad . Then, equation (31) establishes part b of the proposition. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
*Child mortality rate is the number of children dying before age 5 per 1,000 live births. 
Source: International Programs Center - Population Division US Bureau of the Census, 
Washington, DC 
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Figure3
 
 
 
 
